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Argentina underwent a very serious economic 
crisis in the 1990s. In 1996 the Argentinian gov-
ernment launched short-term public employment 
programmes (Trabajar) that provided temporary 
income transfers mostly to the poor, who did not 
receive other social assistance. By 2002, the deep-
ening of the financial crisis further exacerbated un-
employment, increased poverty and generated so-
cial tensions. Thus a newer, larger-scale programme 
(Jefes de Hogar) was initiated.
Trabajar programme, 1996–2001
The Trabajar programme was born as part of a se-
ries of labour market reforms planned for the long-
er-term, but mainly as a reaction to the problem of 
rising poverty related to the increase in unemploy-
ment caused by the effects of the 1995–1996 reces-
sion. The unemployment rate was 17 per cent on 
average but 40 per cent among the poorest in the 
lowest income-decile. The Trabajar programme 
replaced an earlier programme, called PIT, which 
had been proclaimed unsuccessful. Trabajar pro-
vided six hours per day public works temporary 
employment to the members of poorer households 
not receiving unemployment benefit, training or 
other assistance, primarily in small-scale local de-
velopment projects, which were also to the benefit 
of the poor.
Since the primary goal was poverty reduction, 
the main filter mechanism was low wage level. Evi-
dence has shown that the choice of an appropriate 
wage level is a critical element of the design and tar-
geting of public works programmes so that they ac-
tually reach the poorest. The wages in the Trabajar 
programme were later decreased, roughly to two 
thirds of the average wage earned by the poorest 10 
per cent in the country, so that the programme was 
attractive to only those with low income per capita 
and not very good employment prospectives. Be-
sides this self-selection mechanism, the programme 
applied regional development perspectives as well: 
only municipalities of the poorest settlements and 
districts could apply to the project in order to en-
sure that the poor in these localities were provided 
with work opportunities.
Financed by the Argentinian government and 
supported later by the World Bank (financing 
approximately 15 per cent of the costs), the pro-
gramme was implemented by the local and regional 
offices of the Employment and Social Affairs Min-
istry. The ministry compiled a “menu” from eligible 
projects, and provided a number of conditions, cri-
teria and other instructions to the design, evalua-
tion, selection and monitoring of projects. Eligible 
applicants were municipalities (66 per cent of to-
tal projects were run by them), civil organisations 
(15 per cent) and central agencies as well as private 
firms. The most important selection criterion was 
the disadvantaged situation of the region, but oth-
er factors, such as cost-effectiveness, social criteria 
as well as the administrative capacity of the imple-
menter were also taken into account.
In the framework of the Trabajar programme 
typically smaller-scale (below 100 thousand dol-
lars) construction and renovation projects were 
accomplished: renovation of smaller roads, bridg-
es, dams, schools, health institutions, community 
centres and construction of social housing. These 
lasted 4–6 months on average and employed 20 to 
a maximum of 100 persons. There was great empha-
sis put on the involvement of implementers in de-
cisions concerning the program, usage of well-de-
fined selection criteria and continuously performed 
detailed monitoring. Part of the non-wage relat-
ed project costs were financed by the participating 
municipalities themselves – but municipalities in 
disadvantaged regions received higher grants. In-
dividual participants in Trabajar received health 
insurance and coverage for accidents while being 
in the programme.
The selection mechanism worked well, according 
to many international studies and credible impact 
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evaluations (Jalan–Ravallion, 1999, Ravallion et al, 
2001, Ronconi et al, 2006) Trabajar has been one of 
the best targeted programmes1 leading to consider-
able net income transfers: on average by 26 per cent, 
but in the case of the poor, it increased net income 
by 75 per cent. Due to the construction-type work 
far more males (cc. 80 per cent) than females worked 
in the programme, which created approximately 700 
thousand jobs in 85 per cent of the country’s settle-
ments. Another frequently mentioned positive fea-
ture of Trabajar was its harmonisation with oth-
er programmes and systematic monitoring. At the 
same time, it must be noted that Trabajar offered 
only temporary employment that could mitigate but 
not solve the problem of rising unemployment. Later 
on, participating municipalities ran out of resources 
devoted to the measures, and especially after 1999, 
when the crisis intensified again, the program began 
shrinking for budgetary reasons and subsequently 
reached fewer participants.
Jefes de Hogar programme, 2002–2009
This programme was initiated as a quick response 
to evolving social problems in the name of “in-
clusive society”. It focused on unemployed heads 
of poor households by providing them with be-
low minimum wage cash benefits for usually 4–6 
months. One condition of entry was that partic-
ipants enrol their children in schools and take 
them for certain medical checks. In addition, par-
ticipants had to perform community work and/or 
participate in training for 4–6 hours per day. The 
main goal of this programme was not infrastruc-
tural development but the provision of community 
services (community kitchen, handicrafts and oth-
er activities). Thus, the participation rate of women 
was above 70 per cent – much higher than in the 
Trabajar programme, and the local municipalities 
also assumed more important roles. In a short pe-
riod of time, Jefes became a much larger programme 
than Trabajar. 15 per cent of the active labour force, 
i.e. two million people participated in it, which rep-
resented serious challenges in terms of expenditure, 
administration, fraud prevention and so on.
The Jefes programme was less progressive than 
Trabajar, yet it covered a large element of those in 
need and distributed the supports effectively. This 
although, is difficult to evaluate, since beside the 
50 per cent unregistered employment, the govern-
ment did not possess accurate income statistics of 
the poor (Ronconi et al, 2006). Extended with new 
elements, the programme provided useful commu-
nity services and social infrastructure. Participants 
were categorised based on their chances of re-em-
ployment and long term needs for social support. 
Different programme modules (training, comple-
tion of education, local job placement, public works 
positions in services) were combined for these dif-
ferent groups. In each case, the programme pre-
scribed that participants’ children should also be 
beneficiaries of health and education services.
One of the main flaws of the programme was that 
it tried to find solutions for two problems – poverty 
and unemployment – at the same time. Further-
more, the very diverse local capacities also imped-
ed programme implementation (inaccurate regis-
ters, ill-coordinated work conditions, difficulties of 
personal counselling, etc.). There are several meth-
odologically adequate evaluations concerning the 
programme. According to the analysis of Galasso–
Ravallion (2004), many people entered the pro-
gramme who did not fulfil eligibility conditions, 
while some of the really poor were excluded. Never-
theless, the programme decreased aggregate unem-
ployment, and in its first years, the existence of the 
programme saved about 10 per cent of the partici-
pants from sliding into extreme poverty. Ronconi 
et al (2006) followed participants of the Jefes pro-
1 Among others, Ravaillon et al (2001) analysed the 
impact of Trabajar in a way that compared the 
subsequent income of those who exited the pro-
gramme (involuntarily) with those who stayed in, 
as well as with a control group of non-participants. 
According to the study, those who exited suf-
fered from high initial income loss in comparison 
to those who stayed in, as well as in comparison 
to the control group. The study though does not 




gramme for two years in a rolling panel evaluation. 
Relying on the difference in difference method, the 
authors found short-term positive effects on the rise 
of income and therefore, on the decrease of poverty, 
but in the long-term they also observed some nega-
tive effects. Most of the participants were identified 
with very low productivity rates, and the selection 
mechanism was inefficient (many non-eligible in-
dividuals became beneficiaries, and many could 
stay in repeatedly for long periods), which raised 
issues about undue political influence. The evalu-
ation also questioned the programme’s effects on 
growth, as household consumption did not increase 
in the long-term. Moreover, a certain programme 
dependency had also developed. In relation to this, 
the authors raise some political economy consider-
ations, according to which the votes of the 2 mil-
lion participants dependent to such an extent on 
the programme naturally mattered for those poli-
ticians running it.
